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I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 1 Congress finally acknowledged that employment discrimination
against the disabled continues to be a serious problem in the United
States. Approximately forty-three million Americans are disabled.2 As
many as two-thirds of disabled individuals of working age are unem-
ployed, and half of all adults with disabilities have household incomes
of fifteen thousand dollars or less.3 Although most unemployed disabled
individuals depend on insurance payments or government benefits for
support,4 polls reveal that a majority would rather work than depend on
such assistance.5 The ADA provides a comprehensive plan for main-
streaming disabled individuals into American society.6 Congress drafted
the various provisions of the ADA-covering transportation 7 public ac-
commodations,8 telecommunications, 9 and employment discrimina-
tionl°-to remove the physical and attitudinal barriers preventing
qualified individuals with disabilities from obtaining employment."
Not all disabilities, however, are considered equally worthy of pro-
tection; the ADA specifically excludes some conditions recognized as
"handicaps" under its predecessor,12 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.13
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29, 42, and 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ADA].
2. Id. § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 328.
3. 136 CONG. REc. H2428 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Wayne Owens); see
also H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990) (stating that by 1988 disabled
persons earned between 36% and 38% less than other workers).
4. See H.R. RFP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 33.
5. See 135 CONG. REc. S10,791 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (statement of Sen. Donald W.
Riegle).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 22 (stating that "[lt]he purpose of the ADA is to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals
with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life").
7. ADA, supra note 1, §§ 201-246, 104 Stat. at 337-53.
8. Id. 99 301-310, 104 Stat. at 353-65.
9. Id. §9 401-402, 104 Stat. at 366-69.
10. Id. §9 101-108, 104 Stat. at 330-37.
11. For a general overview of the various provisions of the ADA, see Tucker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 923.
12. Compare ADA, supra note 1, § 511(b), 104 Stat. at 376 (excluding, among other things,
transvestism and compulsive gambling from the definition of "disability") with Blackwell v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 639 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1986) (recognizing transvestism as a
handicap under the Rehabilitation Act) and Rezza v. United States Dep't of Justice, 698 F. Supp.
586 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (recognizing compulsive gambling as a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act);
see also Note, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43 VAD. L. Rzv. 1343,
1373-74 (1990) (discussing employees' attempts to argue that "drug addiction" is a handicap pro-
tected from discrimination by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
13. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796
(1988)) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act].
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To add to the confusion, Title I of the ADA excludes some alcoholics
and drug addicts14 from its protections, but does not exclude others.
Specifically, section 104 excludes all individuals "currently engaging in"
the use of illegal drugs,15 but leaves protected those individuals who
previously used illegal drugs but have been rehabilitated or have en-
tered rehabilitation. It also protects those whom employers erroneously
identify as drug users.16 Establishing whether Congress intended section
104 to codify judicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act's provi-
sions regarding addicts17 or to create a new standard will determine how
employers must treat applicants and employees with alcohol or drug
abuse problems, past or present.1 8
This Note explores the ramifications of the ADA's "currently en-
gaging in" standard for alcoholic and drug-addicted employees and ap-
plicants. Part II reviews the employment discrimination provisions of
the ADA. Part III outlines the protection previously afforded addicts
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Part IV examines
the ADA's new "currently engaging in" standard as articulated in sec-
tion 104 of Title I. Part V explores the policy considerations behind the
"currently engaging in" standard and discusses the effects it is likely to
have on addicts in the workplace. Finally, Part VI suggests an analyti-
cal approach that would avoid the confusion created by the Rehabilita-
tion Act. This Note concludes in Part VII that the ADA's "currently
14. Title I excludes drug users rather than drug addicts; thus, addicts are excluded only if
they currently use illegal drugs. See ADA, supra note 1, § 104(a), 104 Stat. at 334. More confusing
is the difference between the terminology of the Rehabilitation Act, supra note 13, § 706(8)(B)
("drug abusers"), and that of the agencies and courts interpreting that act. See, e.g., Burka v. New
York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("drug addicts"); 45 C.F.R. § 85.3
(1989) (Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations) ("drug addicts"). At least
one court has suggested, however, that these terms are interchangeable. See Burka, 680 F. Supp. at
600 n.18. Throughout this Note the term "drug addicts" means both "drug abusers," as Congress
used that term in the Rehabilitation Act, and "drug addicts," as federal agencies and courts have
used that term in the regulations and case law, on the assumption that Congress, federal agencies,
and the courts are referring to the same class of individuals.
15. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(a), 104 Stat. at 334. Section 104(a) reads, in pertinent part:
"the term 'qualified individual with a disability' shall not include any employee or applicant who is
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such
use." Id. (emphasis added); see also infra Part IV.
16. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(b), 104 Stat. at 335. Section 104(b) reads, in pertinent part:
Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to exclude as a qualified individual with a disa-
bility an individual who-(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation pro-
gram [or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully] and is no longer engaging in the illegal
use of drugs ... ; (2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer
engaging in such use; or (3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use ....
Id.; see also infra subpart I(C).
17. See infra notes 126-55 and accompanying text.
18. This Note focuses exclusively on the employment discrimination provisions of the ADA
and primarily on Title I. For a general overview of the ADA's other provisions, see Tucker, supra
note 11.
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engaging in" standard strikes a fair balance between the legitimate con-
cerns of employers and employees and that, if interpreted properly, the
standard will clarify the scope of protection afforded addicts.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Section 102 of the ADA prohibits discrimination19 in employment
and employment-related decisions 20 by all covered entities21 against any
qualified individual with a disability22 on the basis of that disability.23
Title I of the ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimina-
tion that the Department of Health and Human Services set forth in
regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.24 Con-
sequently, the case law under section 504 together with the committee
reports on the ADA provide insight into the scope of protection af-
forded by Title I.
Plaintiffs bringing a private action under Title I must prove four
elements to establish a prima facie case: 25 (1) that they are disabled
19. For a discussion of the acts prohibited by the ADA as discrimination, see infra subpart
II(C).
20. Section 102 lists the following as employment or employment-related decisions: "job ap-
plication procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." ADA, supra note 1, §
102(a), 104 Stat. at 331-32.
21. Title I defines a covered entity as: "an employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee." Id. § 101(2), 104 Stat. at 330. "Employer" is further de-
fined as:
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such person, except that, for two years following [July 26, 1992], an em-
ployer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more em-
ployees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
year, and any agent of such person.
Id. § 101(5)(a), 104 Stat. at 330.
22. The ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disabil-
ity who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 101(8), 104 Stat. at 331. For a
definition of the term "disability," see infra text accompanying note 32.
23. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(a), 104 Stat. at 331-32. Section 102(a) reads: "No covered en-
tity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." Id.
24. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989). -Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals with a handicap in all programs
receiving federal financial assistance. Rehabilitation Act, supra note 13, § 504, 87 Stat. at 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
25. See ADA, supra note 1, § 102(a), 104 Stat. at 331; cf. Strathie v. Department of Transp.,
716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying the Rehabilitation Act and stating that a § 504 claimant
must prove each of four elements to establish a prima facie case).
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within the meaning of the ADA; 28 (2) that they are qualified for the
position in question;27 (3) that the employer discriminated against them
solely on the basis of their disability;" and (4) that the employer is a
covered entity within the meaning of Title I." With the exception of
the fourth element, these requirements are identical to those for a pri-
vate action under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.30 This Note will
discuss only the first three elements because an employee's alcoholism
or drug addiction does not enter into the straightforward calculation of
the fourth.31
A. "Individual with a Disability"
Under section 3 of the ADA an individual has a "disability" if he or
she: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity of the individual; (2) has a record of such impair-
ment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.3 2 This defini-
tion, comparable to the Rehabilitation Act's definition of the term
"individual with handicaps" for purposes of section 504,33 encompasses
all disabled individuals, including those who have recovered or been
rehabilitated."'
1. Impairments that Substantially Limit a Major Life Activity
According to the committee reports on the ADA, impairments in-
clude a broad range of physical and mental ailments.3 5 Physical impair-
26. See infra subpart 11(A).
27. See infra subpart H(B).
28. See infra subpart H(C).
29. See supra note 21.
30. Claimants under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act must show that the employer is a recipi-
ent of federal financial assistance. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 230.
31. In other words, an employee's alcoholism or drug addiction has no relevance to whether
the employer is a covered entity under the ADA. As will be shown below, however, such a condi-
tion is relevant to whether the plaintiff is disabled, qualified, and a victim of discrimination within
the meaning of the ADA.
32. ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2), 104 Stat. at 229-30.
33. Compare id. with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988) (defining "individual with handicaps" in
substantially the same language used in the ADA).
34. See Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection Against Em-
ployment Discrimination for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 507, 510 (1979).
35. While noting that a comprehensive list of all conditions that constitute physical or
mental impairments is impossible, the committee reports state that the term includes such condi-
tions, diseases, and infections as: "orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, infections with the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus [AIDS], cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
specific learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at
51; see S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22.
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ments range from cosmetic disfigurement to anatomical loss,36 and
mental impairments include conditions such as learning disabilities and
organic brain syndrome.3 7 These impairments, however, do not consti-
tute disabilities unless their severity causes a substantial limitation of
one or more major life activities.3 8 Major life activities include walking,
hearing, speaking, breathing, and working."
What constitutes substantial limitation of these major life activities
has not been defined fully. 40 The committee reports on the ADA state
that an individual is substantially impaired when a disability restricts
the conditions, manner, or duration under which the individual can per-
form important life activities as compared to most people.41 For exam-
ple, an individual who begins to experience pain after walking
continuously for ten miles is not substantially limited in the major life
activity of walking because most people could not walk that distance
without experiencing some discomfort.42
Courts applying section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act struggled
with the "substantially limits" requirement, particularly when the ma-
jor life activity alleged to be impaired was the ability to obtain employ-
ment.43 Rather than develop a uniform standard, courts determined on
36. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 51; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22. The House
report defines a physical impairment as:
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting
one or more of the following systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; re-
spiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine ....
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 51.
37. The committee reports define a mental impairment as: "any mental or psychological dis-
order, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and spe-
cific learning disabilities." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 51; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at
22.
38. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22.
39. 1 The committee reports list all of the following as constituting major life activities: "func-
tions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." HR. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra
note 24, at 22.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 22; cf. 45
C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. A-4 (1990) (appendix to the HHS regulations implementing § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act) (stating that a definition of the term "substantially limits" is not feasible at
this time).
41. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
42. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
43. Compare E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding that
the plaintiff's spinal anomaly substantially limited him in obtaining employment because even
though it did not affect his ability to work, it was perceived by employers as making him a higher
risk for serious injury) with Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the plaintiff with strabismus, or crossed eyes, was not substantially limited in his
ability to obtain work because an impairment that affects only a narrow range of jobs does not
substantially limit a major life activity). See generally Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall;- A
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a case-by-case basis whether a given individual's impairment substan-
tially limited a major life activity.44 As a result, employers and persons
bringing claims under section 504 had very little guidance on the degree
to which an impairment must limit a major life activity in order to
qualify as a handicap.
2. Having a "Record of Impairment"
The committee reports on the ADA define "a record of such im-
pairment" as a history of having, or being misclassified as having, a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity.45 This prong of the definition protects individuals who have re-
covered from a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limited them in a major life activity in the past.41 It also protects indi-
viduals who have been diagnosed erroneously as having a disability.
47
Thus, Title I would protect an individual who has recovered from
mental illness, or who has been misclassified as mentally retarded.4"
3. Being "Regarded as" Disabled
The third prong of the ADA's definition of disability covers indi-
viduals that employers treat as disabled even though the employees are
not substantially limited in a major life activity.49 These individuals
typically have a physical or mental impairment that does not substan-
tially limit a major life activity or may have no impairment at all, but
their employers mistakenly believe them to be disabled and discrimi-
nate against them based on these misconceptions.80 This prong of the
Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 527 (1983) (discussing the Marshall court's analysis of when an impairment constitutes
a substantial limitation on employment).
44. See, e.g., Forrisi v. Brown, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany, 755 F.2d. at 1249;
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. at 1100.
45. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
46. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
47. See HL REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
48. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52-53; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23; cf. School
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (finding in a case under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act that an employee with tuberculosis who was hospitalized once for the condition
had a record of substantial impairment of her major life activity of breathing).
49. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 53; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
50. The committee reports state that being regarded as disabled means that the individual:
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities
but that is treated by an employer as constituting such a limitation; (2) has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the atti-
tudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) has no impairment within the meaning of the
ADA, but is treated by an employer as having such an impairment.
H.R. Ran. No. 485, supra note 3, at 53; see S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23.
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definition is particularly important for individuals with stigmatic condi-
tions, such as severe burn scars, that are viewed as physical impair-
ments even though they do not produce a substantial limitation of a
major life activity.5 1
B. Being "Qualified" for the Position in Question
Title I of the ADA protects only "qualified" individuals with disa-
bilities from discrimination in employment.52 Congress limited protec-
tion to "qualified" employees to protect an employer's ability to choose
and maintain qualified workers. Although an employer may not base
hiring decisions on an applicant's disability, an employer may consider
qualifications such as typing speed in determining whether to hire an
applicant.53 Thus, a qualified individual is one who can perform the es-
sential functions of the job held or sought, with or without reasonable
accommodation to his disability.5 4
1. Essential Functions
"Essential functions" refers to job tasks that are fundamental
rather than marginal. 55 The term is included within the definition of a
"qualified individual with a disability" to ensure that the law requires
employers to hire disabled individuals only if they are able to perform
the functions that the job requires.5 ' Thus, essential functions are the
various tasks critical to the position.
The committee reports on the ADA suggest that identifying the es-
sential functions of a position is a factual inquiry to be conducted on a
case-by-case basis.5 7 In their analyses, courts should consider the em-
ployer's judgment concerning which functions of a job are essential. 8 If
51. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 53; see S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 23; cf.
Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding in a § 504 case that a policeman
who had dislocated his shoulder two or more times was handicapped because the city terminated
him on the basis of his potential for a future shoulder dislocation on the job).
52. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(a), 104 Stat. at 331. "Qualified" refers to individuals' current
qualifications and not their potential for future incapacitation. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at
55; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 26.
53. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 56; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 26.
54. ADA, supra note 1, § 101(8), 104 Stat. at 331. Section 101(8) reads, in pertinent part-
"The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment po-
sition that such individual holds or desires." Id. This definition is comparable to the definition
used in the HHS regulations implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare id. with 45
C.F.R. § 94.3(k)(1) (1989).
55. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 55; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 26.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 55; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 26.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 55; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 26.
58. See ADA, supra note 1, § 101(8), 104 Stat. at 331.
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the employer prepared a written description of the position before ad-
vertising for or interviewing applicants, either the employer or the
plaintiff may offer that description as evidence of the essential func-
tions of the job. 9
2. Reasonable Accommodation
Once the court identifies the essential functions of a position and
determines that the plaintiff can perform these functions, the plaintiff
is qualified, and the court can proceed to consider whether the em-
ployer discriminated against the plaintiff.60 If, however, the plaintiff
cannot perform the essential functions of the job as it currently is struc-
tured, the plaintiff must prove that he can perform the essential func-
tions of the job with "reasonable accommodation. '61 Title I's definition
of reasonable accommodation includes making existing facilities readily
accessible to individuals with disabilities, restructuring the particular
position in question, and modifying work schedules.6 2 Failure to provide
reasonable accommodation to qualified applicants and employees is
prohibited as discrimination under the ADA."s Thus, employers must
accommodate the disabilities of otherwise qualified"4 applicants or em-
ployees unless to do so would impose an undue hardship on the em-
ployer's business.65
C. Discrimination on the Basis of a Disability
Title I of the ADA prohibits many forms of employment discrimi-
nation against the disabled. 6 Like many other provisions of Title I, the
list of prohibited activities in section 102(b) borrows heavily from the
regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.6 7 A
plaintiff can establish discrimination within the meaning of section 102
under any one of three theories: (1) that the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff intentionally (intentional discrimination); (2) that
59. Id.; see also 136 CONG. REc. H2623 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hamilton
Fish).
60. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 55-58; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 25-28;
see also Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 56; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 27.
62. ADA, supra note 1, § 101(9), 104 Stat. at 331. For further discussion of the reasonable
accommodation requirement, see infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
63. ADA, supra note 1, § 101(9), 104 Stat. at 331.
64. Congress used the term "otherwise qualified" to describe individuals who meet all of an
employer's job-related hiring criteria, including those that are difficult to meet because of a disa-
bility, if the employer makes reasonable accommodations for their disabilities. See H.R. REP. No.
485, supra note 3, at 64-65.
65. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5)(A), 104 Stat. at 332.
66. See id. § 102(b), 104 Stat. at 332.
67. Compare id. with 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4(b)(4), 84.11(a)(3)-(4), 84.12(a), 84.13 (1989).
1991]
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the employer enforced an employment criterion that was not job related
or required by business necessity and that had a disparate impact on
individuals with disabilities (disparate impact discrimination); or (3)
that the employer failed to accommodate a known disability of the
plaintiff (surmountable barrier discrimination) .61
1. Intentional Discrimination
Like other victims of discrimination, individuals with disabilities
suffer exclusion for reasons of social bias.6 9 Some employers are hostile
to individuals with disabilities and deny employment to the disabled
solely because of personal bias. 0 More often employers deny employ-
ment opportunities to disabled persons because of the employer's often
erroneous assumption that the disability renders the individual incapa-
ble of working. 1 In short, individuals with disabilities suffer primarily
from the benign instincts of the able-bodied majority.7 2
Title I prohibits several forms of discrimination that might be
characterized as intentional. For example, section 102(b) prohibits lim-
iting, segregating, or classifying applicants or employees on the basis of
their disabilities in ways that adversely affect their opportunities or sta-
tus."3 Employers must make employment decisions based on the abili-
ties of the individual and not on the employer's assumptions regarding
what the individual can do.74 In addition, section 102 requires employ-
ers to conduct employment activities in an integrated manner: employ-
68. In analyzing cases under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, courts and commentators have
found that individuals with disabilities actually face four types of exclusionary barriers: the three
types listed in the text accompanying this note and insurmountable barriers. See Prewitt v. United
States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 n.19 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp.
369, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimina-
tion Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 883-84 (1980). Insur-
mountable barriers are not discussed in the text because they are not a form of discrimination
prohibited by § 504. See Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 378; Note, supra, at 885. Thus, these barriers
probably are not prohibited by Title I either.
69. Note, supra note 68, at 883.
70. See id.; U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL DIsA-
BLITms 17-45 (1983) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM].
71. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM, supra note 70, at 29 (quoting Kaplan, Employment
Rights: History, Trends and Status, in 2 LAW REFORM DIsABmIITY RIGHTS E-4 (1981)); see also H.R
REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 58; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 28.
72. The Supreme Court stated, "Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and
indifference-of benign neglect." Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985); see also Tucker,
supra note 11, at 925.
73. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(1), 104 Stat. at 332.
74. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 58; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 28. Thus, the
ADA obligates employers to consider persons with disabilities as individuals rather than prejudg-
ing their abilities on the basis of their appearance or the label that society attaches to persons with
their disabilities.
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ers may not segregate employees with disabilities into particular work
areas, and nonwork areas such as break rooms must be integrated
whenever possible. 75 Employers also may not deny or offer disabled em-
ployees less health insurance coverage than other employees receive.7 6
In addition to proscribing discrimination based on the disability of
the applicant or employee, Title I prohibits discrimination based on a
relationship with an individual who is disabled.7 For example, an em-
ployer may not refuse to hire a qualified applicant whose spouse has a
disability on the assumption that the applicant will miss work fre-
quently to care for the spouse.78 The employer, however, legitimately
may fire an employee who violates a neutral absenteeism policy to care
for a disabled spouse. 9
2. Disparate Impact Discrimination
Another form of discrimination suffered by individuals with disa-
bilities is denial of employment because of neutral standards that have
a disparate impact on disabled persons.80 Although the employer's pur-
pose may not be to discriminate against disabled persons, the standard
as applied may have a discriminatory effect.81 Examples of neutral
standards with a disparate impact include architectural barriers that
restrict the access of persons in wheelchairs and prohibitions of animals
in buildings that effectively bar blind individuals who rely on seeing-eye
75. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 58; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 28. If existing
nonwork areas are inaccessible, employers may provide comparable facilities in an area accessible
to employees with disabilities. H.R REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 58; S. RaP. No. 116, supra note
24, at 28.
76. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 59; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 29. The commit-
tee reports state that the employer may offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain
procedures or treatments. Thus, a hemophiliac employee who exceeds the limit on the number of
blood transfusions covered in a single year, for example, may be denied reimbursement for transfu-
sions over the limit. That same employee, however, may not be denied coverage for other proce-
dures such as heart surgery merely because he is a hemophiliac. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note
3, at 59; S. RaP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 29.
77. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(4), 104 Stat. at 332. It is not clear from the language of the
ADA, however, how these individuals would establish the "disability" element of a prima facie case
because their claims are based on the disability of a third party and not of themselves. The legisla-
tive history does not indicate that Congress ever considered this question. One possibility is that
individuals with a relationship to a disabled person fall within the third prong of the statutory
definition-being regarded as disabled-when the employer takes adverse action against these in-
dividuals on the assumption that their relationship with the disabled person will cause excessive
absences or otherwise hamper their job performance. See HR. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 61; S.
Rap. No. 116, supra note 24, at 30.
78. H.R. Rap. No. 485, supra note 3, at 61; S. RaP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 30.
79. HR. RaP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 61-62; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 30.
80. Note, supra note 68, at 883.
81. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
dogs.2
At least two antidiscrimination provisions of Title I incorporate a
disparate impact standard.83 Section 102(b)(3) prohibits the use of
standards, criteria, or methods of administration that effectively dis-
criminate on the basis of disability or that perpetuate past discrimina-
tion. 4 Section 102(b)(6) prohibits the use of qualification standards,
employment tests, and other selection criteria that screen out, or tend
to screen out, individuals with disabilities, unless the employer can
show that the particular standard is job related and consistent with
business necessity.8 5 Section 102(b)(7), which prohibits the use of tests
that reflect the existence of certain impairments rather than the skills
that the test purports to measure, prohibits acts that may be inten-
tional or neutral with a disparate impact.8 6
The experience of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that a plaintiff
must prove two things to establish disparate impact discrimination
under Title I: (1) that the challenged criterion had a disparate impact
on the protected group of which the plaintiff is a member;87 and (2)
that all the employment criteria except the allegedly discriminatory cri-
terion were met.88 Once a plaintiff makes this showing, the burden
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the criterion in question was
job related and consistent with business necessity.8 9 When the employer
fails to make such a showing, the plaintiff prevails on grounds of dispa-
rate impact discrimination.9
On the other hand, if the employer proves that the challenged cri-
terion was job related and required by business necessity, then the
plaintiff must demonstrate that he met the criterion in question, either
with or without reasonable accommodation.9 If the plaintiff met the
challenged criterion without accommodation, and the employer had no
other valid reason for denying the employment opportunity in ques-
82. Id.
83. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 61 (stating that § 102(b)(3) incorporates a dispa-
rate impact standard).
84. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(3), 104 Stat. at 332.
85. Id. § 102(b)(6), 104 Stat. at 332.
86. See id. § 102(b)(7), 104 Stat. at 332.
87. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying the
Rehabilitation Act). Of course, the plaintiff need not prove that the employer acted with discrimi-
natory intent. Id.
88. Id. at 306-07. Claimants are qualified if they can perform the essential functions of the
position in question without endangering their own or another individual's health or safety. Id. at
307.
89. Id. at 306; see also Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 765 (D. Kan. 1988)
(adopting the Prewitt court's approach to disparate impact claims under the Rehabilitation Act).
90. Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 306-07.
91. Id. at 307.
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tion,'2 the employer discriminated against the plaintiff within the
meaning of Title L"5 If, however, the plaintiff met the criterion only
with accommodation, the plaintiff may prevail only if he demonstrates
that the accommodation would not burden the employer unduly.9 4
3. Surmountable Barrier Discrimination
If a plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of the job as it
is currently structured, the plaintiff still may prevail under Title I if he
demonstrates that "reasonable accommodation" by his employer would
enable him to overcome the barrier created by his disability.95 While
the disability creates the initial obstacle to performance, the employer's
unwillingness to make adjustments to help an individual overcome his
disability reinforces what otherwise might be a surmountable barrier."'
For example, blind individuals may become effective employees if their
employers provide part-time readers to help them complete some of
their duties. 7
Employers are not required to go to unlimited lengths to accommo-
date a disabled applicant or employee. Title I requires employers to
make only those accommodations that are "reasonable"; 98 a proposed
accommodation is not reasonable if it would cause the employer "undue
hardship."9' 9 Actions that entail significant difficulty or expense, 100 or
92. For example, the ADA does not prohibit an employer from taking action against an
employee on the basis of improper off-duty conduct, even if this conduct is related to a protected
disability. For treatments of this issue under the Rehabilitation Act, see Richardson v. United
States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1215-16 (D.D.C. 1985) (involving criminal assault) and Huff
v. Israel, 573 F. Supp. 107, 110 (M.D. Ga. 1983) (involving driving under the influence).
93. See HR REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 67; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 35.
94. When the plaintiff cannot meet the criterion even with accommodation, no illegal dis-
crimination can be proved. See Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 307.
95. See Note, supra note 68, at 884.
96. Id.
97. Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (applying the Rehabilita-
tion Act).
98. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5), 104 Stat. at 332. Title I states that "reasonable accom-
modation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individu-
als with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
Id. § 101(9), 104 Stat. at 331. For a detailed discussion of the reasonable accommodation require-
ment under Title I, see H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 62-70 and S. REP. No. 116, supra note
24, at 30-36.
99. ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5), 104 Stat. at 332.
100. Id. § 101(10), 104 Stat. at 331.
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that require fundamental alteration of the position in question, 0 1 cre-
ate undue hardship within the meaning of Title I. To determine
whether a given accommodation would cause undue hardship, the court
must consider factors such as the nature and cost of the accommoda-
tion, the overall financial resources of the facility involved and of the
covered entity, and the character of the covered entity's operation.10 2
Establishing a prima facie case under the surmountable barrier dis-
crimination theory requires proof of three elements: (1) that the plain-
tiff meets all of an employer's job-related selection criteria except those
that he is unable to meet without accommodation; 0 s (2) that the ac-
commodations proposed by the plaintiff are reasonable (that is, that
they do not cause undue hardship);104 and (3) that the employer refused
to make any of the proposed accommodations. 05 After proof of these
elements, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
proposed accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the bus-
iness.1 06 If the employer fails to establish undue hardship, the plaintiff
prevails.
Proving each of the elements discussed above normally should enti-
tle plaintiffs to relief under Title I. Plaintiffs do not have a cause of
action, however, if the employer proves that the plaintiff currently uses
illegal drugs.10 7 As demonstrated below, Congress created much confu-
sion when it attached a similar exclusion to the Rehabilitation Act in
1978.101
101. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 64.
102. ADA, supra note 1, § 101(10)(B), 104 Stat. at 331. Section 101(10)(B) states that the
factors to be considered in the undue hardship analysis include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; (ii) the overall financial
resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommoda-
tion; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or
the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the over-
all financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity
with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities;
and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition,
structure, and functions of the work force of such entity; the geographic separateness, admin-
istrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id.
103. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 64; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 33.
104. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 65; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 34; cf. also
Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 305 (applying the Rehabilitation Act).
105. See ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5), 104 Stat. at 332.
106. Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308.
107. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,778 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thomas R.
Harkin).
108. See infra subpart H(C).
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III. COVERAGE AFFORDED ADDICTS UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT OF
1973
A. Addiction As Handicap
Nothing in the original language of the Rehabilitation Act indi-
cated whether Congress intended to include addicts within the defini-
tion of "individual[s] with handicaps. "'109 Furthermore, congressional
debates on the Rehabilitation Act made little mention either in favor of
or opposed to including alcoholism or drug addiction within the defini-
tion of a handicap. ° In the process of drafting regulations to imple-
ment section 504, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW)""" solicited an opinion from the United States Attorney General
on this question.112 The Attorney General concluded that Congress's ex-
pressed desire to broaden the scope of individuals covered by section
504 suggested that Congress intended to include addicts within the
definition. 1 8
Courts reached the same conclusion as the Attorney General. For
example, in Davis v. Bucher"1 4 a federal district court held that Phila-
delphia's policy of automatically rejecting all job applicants with a his-
tory of drug abuse violated section 504.115 The court concluded that
individuals with histories of drug use, including current participants in
methadone maintenance programs, were handicapped within the mean-
ing of the Rehabilitation Act.11 6 The court emphasized, however, that
109. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973-Coverage of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 43 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 12, at 3 (1976) [hereinafter Attorney General Opinion]. The Rehabilitation Act defined
"individual with handicaps" the same way the ADA currently defines "individual with disabili-
ties." Compare id. at 2-3 with text accompanying note 32, supra. Congress did not add the limited
exceptions for alcoholics and drug addicts until 1978. See infra subpart HII(B).
110. See Attorney General Opinion, supra note 109.
111. President Gerald Ford designated HEW as the coordinating agency for establishing
guidelines, standards, and procedures for government-wide implementation of § 504. Exec. Order
No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976). These regulations were published in January 1978, 43 Fed.
Reg. 2116 (1978), and are now codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1989) (HHS regulations). The agencies
currently charged with enforcement of § 504 include the Offices of Civil Rights, the Department of
Education, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Tucker, Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act After Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 845,
848.
112. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. A-4; Attorney General Opinion, supra note 109, at 1.
113. Attorney General Opinion, supra note 109, at 9-10.
114. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
115. Id. at 795.
116. Id. at 796. In rejecting the city's argument that Congress did not intend to include drug
addiction in the definition of a handicap for purposes of § 504, the court cited the Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion, see supra note 109, and concluded that Congress intended to protect recovered and
recovering alcoholics and drug addicts from discrimination in order to encourage these individuals
to seek treatment for their addictions. 451 F. Supp. at 796; see also Whitaker v. Board of Higher
Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99, 106 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that the provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act protect alcoholics and drug addicts).
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section 504 protects addicts-like other handicapped individuals-only
when an employer discriminates because of the handicap."117 If an em-
ployer can show that the addict's current or prior drug use prevents
successful performance of the job in question, then the employer is not
liable under section 504.118
Thus, by 1978 the United States Attorney General, HEW, 19 and
the courts had assured employers that section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act did not require them to hire or maintain addicts who were unquali-
fied for their positions. Despite these reassurances, many employers
worried that they could face liability for refusing to hire addicts regard-
less of the individual's competence to perform the job. As a result, em-
ployer groups lobbied Congress for statutory clarification of the
definition.
B. The 1978 Amendment
In response to requests by numerous employers' groups, 12 0 Con-
gress passed the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Develop-
mental Disabilities Amendments of 1978 (1978 Amendment).12 1 The
1978 Amendment redefined "individual with handicaps" to exclude al-
coholics and drug addicts whose current use prevents them from per-
forming the duties of their job or poses a direct threat to the property
or safety of others. 22 According to the legislative history, Congress
drafted the amendment to reassure employers and the public that sec-
tion 504 does not protect employees whose alcohol or drug abuse
problems impair their ability to function on the job, particularly when
their condition might threaten the lives or well-being of others.12 3
117. Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 797 n.4.
118. Id.
119. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A, subpt. A-4 (stating that employers may hold a drug addict or
alcoholic to the same standard of performance and behavior to which they hold other employees,
and that if the employer can show that the individual's addiction or alcoholism prevents successful
performance of the job, § 504 does not protect that individual).
120. 124 CONG. REc. S30,323 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Harrison A.
Williams).
121. Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988))
[hereinafter 1978 Amendment]. Some senators doubted the need for a clarifying amendment. See,
e.g., 124 CONG. REc. S30,324 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (statements of Sens. Harrison A. Williams
and William D. Hathaway).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). To the original definition the amendment added:
For purposes of sections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to employment, such term does
not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or
drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose
employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat
to property or the safety of others.
Id.
123. 124 CONG. REC. S30,323-24 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (statements of Sens. Harrison A.
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The 1978 Amendment reinforced the position that the provisions of
section 504 protect addicts as handicapped individuals only as long as
they are qualified for the position in question.12 4 The 1978 Amendment
essentially codified the interpretation of the United States Attorney
General and the courts that addicts are individuals with handicaps, but
may or may not be otherwise qualified depending on their degree of
impairment.12 5 Unfortunately, the courts did not interpret the 1978
Amendment consistently to reflect this sensible conclusion.
C. Application of the 1978 Amendment
Courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act after the 1978 Amend-
ment generally found alcoholism 1 28 and drug addiction 27 to be handi-
caps within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Some courts have
held, however, that addicts who have not been rehabilitated,1 28 or whose
condition renders them unfit for the job in question1 29 are not handi-
capped.13 0 In addition, courts have held that mere use of drugs, as dis-
Williams and William D. Hathaway).
124. See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7312, 7333-34 (stating that rehabilitated alcoholics and drug users are
protected under § 504).
125. 124 CONG. REc. S37,509-10 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Sen. Harrison A.
Williams).
126. See, e.g., Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141
(8th Cir. 1987); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980); Whitlock
v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Tinch v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346, 348 (E.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d 599
(6th Cir. 1985).
127. See, e.g., Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1986); Wallace v. Veterans Admin.,
683 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Kan. 1988); McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
225, 228 (E.D. Mich. 1985); cf. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 n.14
(1987) (stating that the 1978 Amendment demonstrates that Congress did not intend to exclude
categorically all drug addicts from the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act).
128. See, e.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 600 n.18 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
129. See, e.g., Heron, 803 F.2d at 69 (holding that a heroin addict was not handicapped be-
cause his addiction rendered him unfit for police work); cf. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 447 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that freedom from drug effects is a proper
standard for critical jobs). But see Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 761 (suggesting that drug addiction is
always a handicap, but that the court must determine whether the addict also is "otherwise
qualified").
130. These courts misinterpreted the 1978 Amendment. The literal wording of the 1978
Amendment excluded any individuals who could not perform the duties of the job from the defini-
tion of the term "individual with handicaps," and the legislative history indicated that all addicts
who had not entered or completed successfully a rehabilitation program at the time of their termi-
nation were excluded as well. HR. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7312, 7333-34. It is equally clear, however, that Congress
approved of the administrative and judicial interpretations of the term "individual with handi-
caps" as including alcoholics and drug addicts, 124 CONG. REc. S30,325 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978)
(statement of Sen. William D. Hathaway), and that Congress enacted the 1978 Amendment merely
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tinguished from abuse or addiction, is not a handicap under section
504.1 Most of the cases after the 1978 Amendment, however, focused
on the addict's qualifications and whether the employer's actions were
discriminatory. Often, these issues were inextricably intertwined. 13 2
To prevail under section 504 after the 1978 Amendment, an addict
generally had to have been rehabilitated or in rehabilitation. 13 3 If an
addict committed acts that, standing alone, constituted sufficient
grounds for dismissal, the addict was not protected regardless of
whether the addiction contributed to the behavior.13 4 Additionally, sec-
tion 504 required employers to accommodate addicts only when the em-
ployer had notice of the addiction."3 5 Courts did not make clear,
however, how far section 504 required employers to go in accommodat-
ing an addict before accommodation became an "undue hardship" on
their business operations. 13 6
Often, a finding of discrimination depended heavily on the facts
to clarify the fact that only addicts who are "otherwise qualified" are entitled to the protections of
§ 504. Id. at 30,323-25 (statements of Sens. Harrison A. Williams and William D. Hathaway); see
also 124 CONG. REc. S37,509 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams).
Thus, properly interpreted, the 1978 Amendment does not exclude addiction from the definition of
handicaps; rather, it excludes from the definition of "otherwise qualified" those addicts who fall
within one of the specific exceptions of the 1978 Amendment. Hence, all addicts are individuals
with handicaps for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, and the exceptions enacted by the 1978
Amendment are actually clarifications of what it means to be unqualified under § 504.
131. See, e.g., Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 601 n.20 (holding that use of illegal narcotics does not,
per se, constitute a handicap under § 504); cf. McCleod, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 228
(finding that individuals identified as current drug users by a urinalysis test had failed to show
that their ability to perform a major life activity had been impaired substantially).
132. The analytical structure developed by courts to implement § 504 suggests the reason for
this overlap. As an element of disparate impact discrimination, for example, the plaintiff in one
case had to prove that he met all the employment criteria except the challenged one. See Prewitt
v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). The employer had to demonstrate that
the criterion was job related. If the employer failed, it meant not only that the criterion was dis-
criminatory but that the plaintiff was qualified because he had met all the legitimate criteria for
the job. Id. at 306-07.
Similarly, when the plaintiff alleged surmountable barrier discrimination, he had to prove that
he met all the criteria for the job, including the one alleged to be surmountable albeit with accom-
modation. If the plaintiff made his case and the employer failed to prove undue hardship, the
plaintiff thereby demonstrated both that he was qualified and that the employer discriminated
against him. Id. at 307-08.
133. See, e.g., Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 129-30 n.3; Tinch, 573 F. Supp. at 348.
134. See, e.g., Fong v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 705 F. Supp. 41, 47 (D.D.C. 1989);
Richardson v. United States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1216 (D.D.C. 1985); Huff v. Israel,
573 F. Supp. 107, 110 (M.D. Ga. 1983).
135. See Fong, 705 F. Supp. at 47. The Fong court held that the mere fact that the employer
raised the possibility that alcoholism was responsible for an employee's absences did not trigger
the protections of § 504, particularly when the employee consistently gave other explanations for
his absences. Rather the employer should be held to an objective "should have known" standard
with regard to the employee's alcoholism. Id.
136. For a discussion of the undue hardship limitation on the employer's reasonable accom-
modation duty, see supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
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and circumstances of the individual case. In Copeland v. Philadelphia
Police Department,'7 for example, the Third Circuit found no discrim-
ination under section 504 even though the only ground for the plain-
tiff's dismissal was that he had tested positive for marijuana use on one
occasion." 8 The court reasoned that for the plaintiff to be qualified as a
police officer, he must do more than satisfy the physical aspects of the
job: for certain critical positions employers were entitled to consider ad-
ditional factors such as the employee's moral qualifications.139 Because
unlawful behavior on the part of a police officer would cast doubt on
the integrity of the police force, ° the court concluded that section 504
did not require the police department to accommodate drug users
within its ranks.'41 To do so would amount to substantial modification
of the essential functions of a police officer.4 2
Conversely, in Nisperos v. Buck, 3 a section 501 case, 4 the court
found an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) attorney to be
qualified despite his cocaine addiction. 4 5 The court cited the attorney's
evaluations, which showed that he had performed his duties success-
fully, 4 6 and noted that he had entered a rehabilitation program at the
time he was terminated.1 7 The court held that requiring the INS to
accommodate the attorney was reasonable because the agency could re-
assign those duties for which it considered the plaintiff to be unquali-
fied without undue hardship. 4 8
137. 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988).
138. Id. at 1149.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 720 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
144. Rehabilitation Act, supra note 13, § 501, 87 Stat. at 390 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 791 (1988)). Section 501 required federal executive agencies to implement affirmative ac-
tion programs to employ handicapped individuals. Lemere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275, 276 n.1
(D.D.C. 1988). Section 501 obligated federal agencies to meet a higher level of accommodation than
§ 504 required of federal aid recipients. See Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129-30
(D.D.C. 1984). But cf. Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 763 (D. Kan. 1988) (finding
that because both § 501 and § 504 imposed a duty of reasonable accommodation on an employer, a
separate analysis of employers' actions under each section is not required). For example, § 501,
unlike § 504, protected alcoholics currently using alcohol who are not in rehabilitation. See
Lemere, 683 F. Supp. at 276 n.1; Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 129. Thus, courts finding that a partic-
ular accommodation was required by § 501 might have reached a different result under § 504.
Conversely, if a court found that an accommodation was not required by § 501, it almost certainly
would have reached the same conclusion under § 504.
145. Nisperos, 720 F. Supp. at 1428.
146. Id. at 1428 & n.7.
147. Id. at 1427.
148. Id. at 1432; see also Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 765 (holding that an employer could
reasonably accommodate a recovering chemically dependent nurse who was unable to administer
narcotics to patients because of her condition by allowing another registered nurse to administer
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Even courts interpreting section 501 have found definite limits to
an employer's duty to accommodate an addict. For example, when the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted an alcoholic employee
two extended leaves-of-absence to seek rehabilitation and offered a
third in lieu of termination, a reviewing court found the agency's efforts
"more than reasonable."14 The court reasoned that the employee's un-
reliable and erratic conduct had become an undue hardship on the
agency and that the FAA was not required to rescind its termination
decision after learning that the plaintiff had reentered a treatment pro-
gram.15 In another case, the Eighth Circuit held that an alcoholic ap-
plicant for federal employment was not qualified for the position, given
an extensive history of rehabilitative failure and the lack of evidence to
suggest that future efforts at rehabilitation would be more successful. 51
The rationale behind many of these decisions was well articulated
in a case involving civilian employees of the armed forces.152 In an-
nouncing a five-step procedure for federal agencies to follow when en-
countering problems with alcoholic employees, the Fourth Circuit
identified two concerns that arose when the Rehabilitation Act was ap-
plied to addicts. 53 On the one hand, the court emphasized the need to
make some allowance for rehabilitative failure so that addicts have a
reasonable opportunity to overcome their addictions.15 4 On the other
hand, the court underscored the importance of confronting addicts
firmly with the consequences of their addictions rather than requiring
employers to bear indefinitely the expense of accommodating them. 55
The Fourth Circuit concluded that reasonable accommodation entails
finding the proper balance between these two concerns.15 6
narcotics when necessary).
149. Lemere, 683 F. Supp. at 278.
150. Id. at 279.
151. Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir.
1987).
152. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 259.
154. Id.; see also Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 950 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding that an
agency was not justified in concluding that it could not reasonably accommodate an alcoholic em-
ployee based on a single instance of rehabilitative failure); Burchell v. Department of the Army,
679 F. Supp. 1393, 1401-02 (D.S.C. 1988) (holding that the Army could not terminate an alcoholic
employee who had entered and failed a rehabilitation program when the Army had not determined
whether it could accommodate the employee's condition by permitting him to use accumulated
sick leave or allowing him to take disability retirement).
155. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259.
156. Id.
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IV. THE ADA's "CURRENTLY ENGAGING IN" STANDARD
Section 104(a) of the ADA provides that, for purposes of Title I,
the term "qualified individual with a disability" does not include indi-
viduals who currently use illegal drugs 157 or abuse alcohol.158 As long as
the employer acts on the basis of drug or alcohol use-and not a pro-
tected disability-the addict is without protection under the ADA."'9 If,
however, an addict has been rehabilitated or entered rehabilitation and
no longer uses drugs or alcohol, Title I protects that addict from dis-
crimination.160 Title I also protects individuals whom employers errone-
ously identify as illegal drug users.""'
Section 104 authorizes employers to take reasonable measures, in-
cluding drug testing, to ensure that individuals in rehabilitation no
longer use illegal drugs.16 2 Employers may require applicants to take a
drug test before making an offer of employment. 63 Employers also may
require current employees to take a drug test without showing that the
test is job related or a business necessity.'16 Employers, however, must
157. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(a), 104 Stat. at 334. Individuals are currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs if they have used drugs recently enough to support a reasonable belief that
their drug use is "current." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1990); see also 135
CONG. REC. S10,782 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (colloquy between Sens. William L. Armstrong and
Thomas R. Harkin) (concluding that termination for alcohol abuse off the job may be permitted
when the abuse is relevant to the employee's qualifications for the job).
158. Confusingly, § 104(a) does not mention alcoholics, see ADA, supra note 1, § 104(a), 104
Stat. at 334, but the title of § 104--"Illegal Use of Drugs and Alcohol"'-and most of its subsec-
tions do refer to alcohol abuse. See id. § 104(c)-(e), 104 Stat. at 334-36. The legislative history
indicates, moreover, that Congress intended § 104(a) to apply to alcoholics as well as drug addicts.
See 135 CONG. REC. S10,753 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (colloquy between Sens. Thomas R. Harkin
and William L. Armstrong); id. at S10,777 (colloquy between Sens. Thomas R. Harkin and Daniel
R. Coats).
159. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 77. In other words, current drug users who are
otherwise disabled under the ADA still are protected against discrimination on the basis of that
disability. If the employer acts on the basis of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse, however, that
individual is not protected simply by virtue of a disability. Id.
160. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(b), 104 Stat. at 335. Section 104, however, does not require an
employer to provide a rehabilitation program or even an opportunity for rehabilitation when an
employee's current use is discovered. Addicts already must be rehabilitated or in rehabilitation at
the time their employers take adverse action against them. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 41-
42.
161. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(b), 104 Stat. at 335; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 77.
162. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(b), 104 Stat. at 335. In fact, nothing in the ADA prohibits an
employer from giving a test to any applicant or employee and refusing to hire the applicant or
taking action against the employee because this result indicated illegal drug use. H.R. REP. No. 485,
supra note 3, at 79-80.
163. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 79. But cf. id. at 79-80 (stating that § 102(c) prohib-
its administration of a drug test prior to a conditional offer of employment for the purpose of
detecting the use of prescription drugs).
164. H.R REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 79; cf. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, supra note 157, at 60
(stating that individuals covered by Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations described in
§ 104(c)(5) are not covered by the ADA if they test positive on an employment-related drug test).
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use the tests to identify illegal drug use and not the legal use of pre-
scription medication.6 5 In addition, the test results must be accurate.166
When an employer takes adverse employment action against an individ-
ual on the basis of inaccurate test results, that individual may challenge
the adverse employment action as discrimination.16 7 Unfortunately, the
ADA does not provide a standard to evaluate the accuracy or validity of
a drug test result. e8
Section 104 authorizes employers to adopt certain measures to en-
sure that their workplaces remain free from the effects of alcohol and
drug use. For example, employers may prohibit the use of illegal drugs
or alcohol at the workplace 6 9 and require employees to be free from the
influence of alcohol or drugs while at work. 170 In addition, employers
may hold addicts to the same hiring and job-performance standards to
which they hold other employees, even if the addict's addiction contrib-
utes to an inability to meet such standards.17 1 These provisions and the
authorization of drug testing suggest that the ADA allows employers
165. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 80.
166. Id. at 79; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 24, at 41; cf. H.R CONF. REP. No. 558, supra note
157, at 60 (stating that employers must verify drug tests of individuals covered by the DOT regula-
tions described in § 104(c)(5) in conformity with applicable federal regulations or guidelines).
167. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, supra note 157, at 60 (stating that the conferees did not
intend to prevent individuals covered by the employment provisions of the ADA from challenging
a positive drug test result by invoking the protection of § 104(b)(3), which protects those errone-
ously regarded as engaging in the illegal use of drugs); H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 80
(stating that individuals who test positive for use of illegal drugs may challenge adverse employ-
ment action taken against them on the grounds that the positive result was caused by medication
taken under medical supervision).
168. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 558, supra note 157, at 60. Most commentators encourage employ-
ers to use a two-tiered approach to drug testing: (1) conduct initial screenings with relatively inex-
pensive enzyme immunoassay tests such as the Syva Company's desk-top sized kit called EMIT;
and (2) confirm any positive results with more accurate-but more expensive-techniques such as
Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS). See, e.g., Rothstein, Drug Testing in the
Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.-KENT L. Rav.
683, 691-93 (1987); Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MXML L. REv. 553, 563-66
(1988) [hereinafter Survey]; Note, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Need for Quality Assur-
ance Legislation, 48 OHo ST. L.J. 877, 878-80 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Need for Quality]; Note,
Employee Drug Testing-Balancing the Interests in the Workplace: A Reasonable Suspicion
Standard, 74 VA. L. REV. 969, 987-89 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Balancing the Interests]. This ap-
proach is reasonable because it enables employers to screen employees at a relatively low cost and
protects employees against being identified falsely as drug users. See Rothstein, supra, at 692;
Survey, supra, at 564-65 & n.51; Note, Need for Quality, supra, at 880; Note, Balancing the Inter-
ests, supra, at 988-89 & n.121.
169. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(c)(1), 104 Stat. at 335.
170. Id. § 104(c)(2), 104 Stat. at 335.
171. Id. § 104(c)(4), 104 Stat. at 335. Section 104(c) also permits employers to require em-
ployees to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 and any other relevant federal laws
or regulations. See id. § 104(c), 104 Stat. at 335.
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broad discretion to identify addicts in the work force and take action
against them as the employer deems appropriate. 17 2
V. ADDICTION As DISABILITY: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND LIKELY
EFFECTS OF SECTION 104
A. Congressional Policy Behind the "Currently Engaging in"
Standard
Alcoholism and drug addiction impose enormous costs on American
society. As many as twenty-three million Americans currently use some
type of illegal substance, and ten million are cocaine-dependent. 173 Ap-
proximately eighteen million adults in the United States are al-
coholics.' 74 Alcohol and drug abuse on and off the job costs employers
billions of dollars annually in lost productivity and employment-related
costs. 17 5 Alcohol and drug impairment contribute significantly to acci-
dents on the job causing deaths, injuries, and millions of dollars in
property damage.178 Impairment-related accidents expose employers to
further costs in the form of higher insurance rates and respondeat supe-
rior liability. 177
Congress drafted section 104 to meet these legitimate concerns of
the business community.17 8 Members of Congress expressed concern
that Title I might hamper employers' efforts to rid their work forces of
recalcitrant addicts. 179 Congress acted to enable employers to imple-
172. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 79; 135 CONG. REC, S10,782 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1989) (colloquy between Sens. Thomas R. Armstrong and William L. Harkin).
173. Rothstein, supra note 168, at 684-85. In addition, from 1977 to 1987, cocaine-related
deaths in the United States increased 200%, and admissions to drug abuse treatment programs
rose 500%. Id. at 685.
174. Id. at 685. Nearly half of all automobile accidents, one-fourth of all suicides, and four-
fifths of all family court cases involved alcohol. Id.
175. Estimates of the combined costs of alcoholism and drug addiction to American business
range from $99 billion, M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS
98 (1989), to as high as $120 billion. OSHA Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse on Worker Health and Safety: Hearings of the House Subcomm. on Health and Safety of
the Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985) (statement of Robert L. Du-
Pont, M.D., Vice President, Bensigner, DuPont & Associates and President, Center for Behavioral
Medicine); see also Note, Balancing the Interests, supra note 168, at 971.
176. Between 1975 and 1984, drug and alcohol use by railroad employees caused 48 accidents
that in turn caused 37 deaths, 80 nonfatal injuries, and over $34 million in property damage. Ac-
cording to some estimates, drug users have three to four times as many accidents as nonusers. M.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 175, at 98. Indeed, drug abuse has been called the most common health
hazard in the American workplace. Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector
Employers, 65 N.C.L. REv. 832 (1987) (quoting D. CoPus, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE 1
(Aug. 8, 1986) (unpublished manuscript available from the National Employment Law Institute)).
177. M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 175, at 98-100.
178. 135 CONG. REC. S10,777 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thomas R. Harkin).
179. See id. at S10,775 (statement of Sen. Jesse A. Helms).
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ment "zero tolerance" policies regarding alcohol and drug abuse with-
out fear of liability under the ADA.180
On the other hand, Congress recognized that treatment for those
addicted to drugs is not only compassionate but also essential to a com-
prehensive attack on drug use."s" Congress drafted section 104 to pro-
tect individuals who enter rehabilitation from adverse employment
action in order to encourage drug addicts to seek treatment for their
condition."" Congress recognized that taking action against addicts
based on assumptions about their abilities is as discriminatory as taking
action against other disabled persons because of similar foundationless
assumptions.183
One example of a congressional attempt to facilitate employers' ef-
forts to maintain drug-free workplaces is the authorization of drug test-
ing for employees and applicants.1 8 4 By insisting that tests be accurate,
however, Congress recognized the injustice of allowing employers to ter-
minate individuals who are not drug users or alcohol abusers on the
basis of erroneously positive test results.8 5 Committees reporting on
the ADA stated very plainly that drug tests must be designed to detect
accurately the presence of illegal drugs rather than the presence of legal
prescription medication.88
Thus, Congress drafted section 104 to strike a delicate balance be-
tween the interests of employers and their employees.1 87 It recognized
the need to protect employers, other workers, and the public from per-
sons whose current drug use either impairs their ability to perform a
job or threatens to cause serious harm to the lives or property of
others.1 8 At the same time, it acknowledges that effective treatment for
addicts is an essential component of the war on drugs. 8 9 This approach
effectively reconciles the needs of addicts with the rights and legitimate
interests of others. 90
180. See id. at S10,777 (statement of Sen. Daniel R. Coats).
181. 136 CONG. REC. H2443 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Charles D. Rangel).
Congressman Rangel stated: "Treatment can save the lives of individual abusers, and it can also
return them to productive roles in society...." Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at H2443-44.
184. 135 CONG. REc. S10,777 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thomas R. Harkin).
185. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 80.
186. Id.; see supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
187. 136 CONG. REc. H2443 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Charles D. Rangel).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Note, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of United
States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1308-09 (1990) (concluding that the United States should
place more emphasis on treatment of drug addicts in its efforts to combat the drug problem).
190. "Rights" refers to the rights of other workers and the public not to have their lives,
health, or property jeopardized by drug-impaired individuals. "Legitimate interests" means the
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B. Likely Effects of Section 104
As noted above,19' Congress confused the status of addicts by mak-
ing the 1978 Amendment applicable to the definition of an "individual
with handicaps" rather than the definition of a "qualified individ-
ual."'" 2 This quirk in the language of the statute led to decisions finding
that addicts were not handicapped because they fell within a statutory
exception or had not been rehabilitated or entered a rehabilitation pro-
gram. 93 Section 104 clarifies the situation by expressly excluding indi-
viduals who currently use illegal drugs from the definition of "qualified
individual with a disability."' 9
On the other hand, section 104 is somewhat ambiguous with regard
to current and former alcoholics. Because of its literal wording, the
"currently engaging in" standard may apply only to individuals cur-
rently engaging in the use of illegal drugs. "' While alcoholics bringing
claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act remain subject to the
standard enacted by the 1978 Amendment,9"' it is not clear from the
face of the statute which standard Congress intended to apply to al-
coholics bringing claims under Title I of the ADA.1 97 Congress should
amend section 104 to avoid further confusion.
On its face, section 104 appears to exclude more addicts from the
protections of the ADA than the 1978 Amendment excluded under the
Rehabilitation Act.' 98 Section 104 applies not only to addicts whose cur-
rent use renders them unqualified or a threat to property or safety; it
interest of employers in taking disciplinary action against unproductive-and in some cases
dangerous-workers.
191. See supra note 130.
192. The exclusions for individuals who could not perform the duties of the position and for
individuals whose employment posed a direct threat to the property or safety of others implicate
their job qualifications, not their status as handicapped or not handicapped. The same is true of
the employee's seeking or falling to seek rehabilitation. By making the statutory exceptions for
certain classes of alcoholics and drug users applicable to the definition of "individual with handi-
caps," Congress collapsed the separate inquiries into the existence of a handicap and the individ-
ual's qualifications into a single inquiry, thus creating a situation in which it was unclear from the
language of the statute whether an individual falling within one of the exceptions should be con-
sidered handicapped but not qualified or, alternatively, not handicapped at all. See id
193. See, e.g., Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1986); Burka v. New York City
Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
194. See ADA, supra note 1, § 104(a), 104 Stat. at 334. The faulty language from the 1978
Amendment, however, remains in effect for alcoholics bringing suit under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act. See id. § 512(a), 104 Stat. at 377.
195. See supra note 158.
196. ADA, supra note 1, § 512(a), 104 Stat. at 377.
197. But see 135 CONG. REc. S10,753 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (colloquy between Sens.
Thomas R. Harkin and William L. Armstrong); id. at S10,777 (colloquy between Sens. Thomas R.
Harkin and Daniel R. Coats).
198. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,775 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Jesse A. Helms);
136 CONG. REc. H2443 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Charles D. Rangel).
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also excludes all current users who have not been rehabilitated or en-
tered a rehabilitation program. 9 9 In addition, section 104 authorizes
employers to test applicants and employees for drugs200 and make em-
ployment decisions based on the results. 0 1 In actual application, how-
ever, the ADA should not provide narrower coverage than the
Rehabilitation Act given that courts have held that the latter also ex-
cludes unrehabilitated addicts20 2 and permits drug testing and employer
action based on positive results.20 8
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The difficulty with enforcing laws designed to eliminate discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals is that, unlike most civil rights legisla-
tion, precise definition of the protected class is necessary to accomplish
the purposes of the legislation.20 4 Interpreting the definition of "disabil-
ity" too broadly encompasses persons with only minor ailments or who
are not truly disabled.0 5 Including such individuals trivializes the im-
portance of the protection the law affords. On the other hand, inter-
preting the definition too narrowly might exclude individuals who truly
are disabled and who require protection from discrimination. When ap-
plying the ADA to specific cases, courts must avoid the two extremes of
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.
While congressional intent behind section 104 is fairly clear, ambi-
guities such as those noted above206 may confuse courts the same way
the 1978 Amendments did. To avoid confusion, courts should focus
199. A drug addict who has not been rehabilitated possibly could be qualified for the position
and not be a direct threat to the property or the safety of others. See, e.g., Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F.
Supp. 1424, 1431 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that an Immigration and Naturalization Service attor-
ney had demonstrated that he was qualified for his position despite his drug use). Thus, to the
extent that the Rehabilitation Act protected these individuals, the ADA reduces the protections
afforded addicts. As explained below, however, this reduction should affect a relatively small num-
ber of individuals. See infra text accompanying notes 202-03.
200. ADA, supra note 1, § 104(b), (d)(1), 104 Stat. at 335-36.
201. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 79.
202. See, e.g., Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 599.
203. See id. at 601; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 447 n.6
(D.D.C. 1987).
204. O'Connor, Defining "Handicap" for Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARiz.
L. RE v. 633 (1988). O'Connor states:
More than in any other area of civil rights litigation, the effectiveness of [federal and state
laws prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped] has turned on the definition given
to the protected class-both in the manner in which the legislature has chosen to define
"handicap," and in the ways in which the courts have construed and interpreted that
definition."
Id. at 633.
205. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 3, at 52 (stating that a person with a temporary,
trivial impairment like an infected finger is not disabled for purposes of the ADA).
206. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
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their inquiry on the four basic elements of a prima facie case.207 Courts
should incorporate the special provisions of the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act regarding addicts into the four-part analysis as factors rele-
vant to the "qualified" element of a prima facie case. Addicts always
should be considered disabled for purposes of Title I or section 504, but
still must be required to prove the other elements of a prima facie case
before being eligible for the protections of either act.208 Focusing the
inquiry on the elements of a prima facie case avoids the confusion of
applying one test for addiction and another for other disabilities. More
important, this approach more accurately reflects Congress's intent
when it enacted the special provisions regarding addicts.0 9
Finally, courts should interpret section 104's exception for rehabili-
tated and rehabilitating addicts as creating a presumption that a given
addict's prior drug use does not affect the addict's qualifications for the
job in question. As explained above, 10 Congress wanted to give addicts
an opportunity to reform their lives rather than have them forever face
stigmatization for a history of addiction. Furthermore, prior addiction
does not disqualify an individual in most situations.21 Thus, such a
presumption should be rebuttable only by evidence that prior drug use
is relevant to a valid, job-related criterion for the position in
question.21
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 104 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 clarifies
the coverage of addicts under disability discrimination law, but leaves
unclear the status of alcoholics under the ADA. Although it excludes
current drug addicts from the protections of Title I, section 104 other-
wise should provide the same level of protection to addicts provided by
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Properly interpreted, section 104 strikes
a reasonable balance between the legitimate interest of employers in a
drug-free workplace and the interests of applicants and employees
whether or not they have alcohol or drug problems. Overall, section 104
should provide a workable standard for courts to employ in resolving
207. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 130.
209. This conclusion is reflected by the fact that § 104's exclusionary rule applies to the
definition of a "qualified individual with a disability." See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying
text.
210. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Davis v. Bucher,
451 F. Supp. 791, 797 & n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
212. Cf. Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988).
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the clash between society's rights and the rights of the individual
addict.
Reese John Henderson, Jr.
